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Reason for Amicus Curiae Brief
Amicus Curiae Rocky Mountain Innocence Center ("RMIC") files this brief to
assist the court in applying the correct analytical framework under the "Postconviction
Determination of Factual Innocence" statute, Utah Code section 78B-9-401. The
innocence statute became effective in 2008 and has not been interpreted by Utah
appellate courts. For that reason, this court's interpretation of the statute will be
influential with district courts regardless of the outcome of this appeal.
At the outset, it is important to understand that the purpose of the innocence
statute is not to compensate those wrongly convicted for their time in prison. Nothing
can compensate for that. The primary purpose of the statute is to provide courts with
jurisdiction (i) to entertain factual innocence claims, (ii) to create a record for the review
of factual innocence claims, and (iii) in the vast majority of cases, to determine whether a
prisoner should be released from prison. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-402 to -404 (2008).
In enacting the innocence statute, the legislature recognized the criminal justice
system sometimes sends innocent people to prison. The innocence statute is designed to
ensure that factually innocent prisoners have a forum to present their innocence claims,
even when they lack objective DNA evidence described in the DNA testing statute, Utah
Code section 78B-9-300. Because many innocence claims do not involve objective DNA
evidence, a crucial aspect of the innocence statute is its requirement that "the court shall
order a hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is factually
innocent of the charges of which the petitioner was convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
9-402(6)(b)(i) (emphasis added). A hearing at which prisoners can present evidence of
factual innocence fulfills the primary purpose of the innocence statute.
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A secondary purpose of the innocence statute is to provide an "assistance
payment" to a factually innocent petitioner who was wrongfully incarcerated. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-9-405. The focus of this appeal is unusual because Harry Miller is no longer
in prison. Nonetheless, this case is about whether Mr. Miller can prove that he was
wrongfully convicted and not about whether he qualifies for an "assistance payment."
The posture of this case should not influence this court's interpretation of the
statute. The innocence statute applies not only in unusual cases like this one, but also in
the majority of innocence cases in which a factually innocent prisoner without objective
DNA evidence seeks release from prison. While this may be an obvious point, it is a
point worth making in light of the State's assertion that "[t]he purpose of the statute is to
financially compensate one who can provide by clear and convincing evidence that he is
factually innocent and was wrongly imprisoned." (State's Brief at 14.)
RMIC first will outline the relevant procedural history and then describe the
analytical framework within which factual innocence claims should be analyzed.
Relevant Procedural History
In 2002, a jury wrongfully convicted Mr. Miller of aggravated robbery when his
trial counsel failed to develop and present alibi evidence showing that Mr. Miller was in
Louisiana at the time of the crime. (R2 135-39.)1 The trial court sentenced Mr. Miller to
five years to life in prison. On appeal, Mr. Miller moved for a Rule 23B remand to
permit the trial court to determine whether his trial counsel had been constitutionally
ineffective in failing to present the testimony of alibi witnesses. (R2 164-67.) During the
1 Following the practice of the parties, RMIC will refer to the record in the underlying
criminal case using "R2" and the record in this case using "R."
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Rule 23B remand hearing, Mr. Miller presented an affidavit of Beverly Kolder and an
affidavit and the live testimony of Berthella Miller. The Kolder and Miller affidavits
were offered to show that Mr. Miller, a recent stroke victim, had insufficient time to
travel from Louisiana to commit the crime and then back to Louisiana after the crime.
(R. 14-24.) After considering that evidence, the trial court ruled that (i) trial counsel's
performance in failing to present Ms. Kolder and Ms. Miller as witnesses was not
constitutionally deficient and (ii) even if counsel's performance had been constitutionally
deficient, "there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial.,,2 (R. 26.)
After the Rule 23B remand hearing, the State stipulated to summary reversal in the
appellate court on the ground that "the interest ofjustice dictate that [Mr. Miller] receive
a new trial." (R. 30.) However, the prosecutor did not proceed to trial, but instead
moved to dismiss all charges. (R.3.) On July 6, 2007-more than 4 years after the jury
convicted Mr. Miller-the trial court dismissed all charges "in the interest ofjustice."
(State's Brief at Addendum F.)
On May 7,2008, Mr. Miller filed his petition under the factual innocence statute.
(R. 1-5.) In its support, Mr. Miller provided copies of the Kolder and Miller affidavits
previously submitted during the Rule 23B remand hearing. (R. 31-48.) The State moved
to dismiss the petition under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the petition describes only
evidence the trial court considered during the Rule 23B remand hearing. The State
argued that the trial court had already ruled that that evidence failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. (R. 64, 73-79.)
2 In this proceeding, the same trial court found that "the evidence makes it unlikely that
Petitioner committed the crime." (R. 172.)
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The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss. The court first ruled that the
evidence described by Mr. Miller was not "newly discovered" under section
402(a)(vi)(A)3 because he was aware of the Kolder and Miller affidavits at the time of the
Rule 23B remand hearing. (R. 172.) The trial court then ruled that Mr. Miller could not
satisfy the "ineffective assistance" exception under section 402(a)(vi)(B) because the
court had previously ruled that Mr. Miller's trial counsel was not constitutionally
ineffective. (Id.) Importantly, the trial court did not consider whether the "interest of
justice" exception in section 402(2)(a)(vi)(C) applied because "Petitioner has not met
other prongs of Section 78B-9-402." (Id. (emphasis added).)
3Utah Code section 402(2)(a) provides:
A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the
district court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing
to establish that the person is factually innocent of the crime or crimes of
which the person was convicted, if the person asserts factual innocence
under oath and the petition alleges:
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the
petitioner is factually innocent;
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner
claims establishes innocence;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that
was known;
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually innocent; and
(vi) (A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction
motion, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the
petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; or
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A)
or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest ofjustice.
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The court cited two "other prongs" that Mr. Miller had not satisfied: (i) section
402(2)(a)(iii)'s requirement that the new evidence not be "merely cumulative of evidence
that was known" and (ii) section 404(1)(b)'s requirement that a petitioner establish
"factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.,,4 (Id.) The trial court ruled that
Mr. Miller had not satisfied the "no cumulative evidence" requirement because he
"presented his alibi defense at trial," and the evidence described in the petition "would
have served only to bolster his testimony, not present a wholly new assertion." (Id.) The
trial court then ruled that Mr. Miller had not shown that the evidence described in the
petition "would 'establish' that he was innocent." (Id.)
Finally, the trial court made an internally inconsistent ruling: "Although the
evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime, the Court reviewed this
evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals and determined that there was 'no
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had
testified.'" (Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).) It is unclear how evidence that
makes it "more likely than not" Mr. Miller was innocent could fail to create a reasonable
probability that a jury would not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.5
4 "In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent the
state. The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by
clear and convincing evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(1).
5 The State quotes only the last part of the trial court's statement-"no reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had testified"-which
concerns only the court's ruling after the Rule 23B remand hearing. (State's Brief at 35.)
The State then argues that Mr. Miller "did not establish on appeal, and has not established
in this proceeding, that the 23B findings were clearly erroneous." (Id.) Of course,
Mr. Miller did not establish that the findings were clearly erroneous on appeal because
the State agreed to summary reversal before the appellate court could reach the merits.
And Mr. Miller did not establish that the findings were clearly erroneous in this
proceeding because the trial court dismissed his petition at the pleading stage.
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Summary of the Argument
First, the correct standard in determining whether the allegations in Mr. Miller's
petition warrant a hearing is whether the petition presents a "bona fide issue" concerning
factual innocence. It is not, as the State asserts, "whether the petition proved by clear and
convincing evidence that he was factually innocent." (State's Brief at 17.) This court
should spell out that the "clear and convincing" standard applies to evidence presented at
a hearing to determine innocence, and the "bona fide issue" standard applies to
allegations in a petition to determine whether a hearing is required in the first place.
Second, the trial court misinterpreted the requirement that evidence described in a
petition cannot be "merely cumulative of evidence that was known." The trial court ruled
that because Mr. Miller presented an alibi defense at trial, any newly discovered evidence
supporting that alibi defense would be "merely cumulative." The court's interpretation of
the term "cumulative" is too broad. Mr. Miller's alibi defense, which was not developed
at trial, was that he was in Louisiana at the time the crime was committed. On the trial
court's interpretation, any newly discovered evidence that demonstrates Mr. Miller was
in Louisiana during the commission of the crime would be "merely cumulative" and
therefore could not be used to prove factual innocence, even if Mr. Miller were currently
in prison. This court should reject that narrow interpretation of "cumulative" and adopt
the following standard: Evidence is cumulative if it is the same evidence in a different
form; but it is not cumulative if it is different evidence that supports the same theory.
Third, the trial court should have determined whether the "interest ofjustice"
exception applies. In reviewing a petition, trial courts must make the following
determinations: (i) whether the petition describes evidence that is "new" in that it neither
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was known nor should have been discovered during a prior proceeding; (ii) if not,
whether prior counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to discover and present
the evidence in a prior proceeding; and (iii) if not, whether the court nonetheless should
order an evidentiary hearing to determine factual innocence in the interest ofjustice.
Here, the trial court ruled that the evidence described in Mr. Miller's petition was not
"newly discovered." Assuming this ruling is correct, the trial court erred in its
interpretation of the two exceptions.
The trial court first ruled that it need not determine whether Mr. Miller's counsel
was constitutionally ineffective because it had already found that trial counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective in the Rule 23B hearing. The court failed to consider,
however, whether Mr. Miller's counsel during the Rule 23B hearing was constitutionally
ineffective. This court should clarify that the "constitutionally ineffective" exception can
be satisfied by any prior counsel's deficient performance.
The trial court next declined to consider whether the "interest ofjustice" exception
applies on the ground that the following two rulings had made it unnecessary: (i) the
petition described evidence that was "merely cumulative" and (ii) the allegations failed to
establish factual innocence. Because those two rulings applied incorrect standards, they
cannot justify the trial court's failure to make an "interest ofjustice" determination. This
is especially true in this case, where (i) the trial court found that "the evidence makes it
unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime;" (ii) the State previously agreed that
Mr. Miller deserved a new trial "in the interest ofjustice;" (iii) the trial court dismissed
all charges against Mr. Miller "in the interest ofjustice," and (iv) the evidence of factual
innocence is overwhelming.
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This court should reverse the order dismissing the petition, clarify the standards
the trial court should apply under the innocence statute, and order the trial court to
determine whether a hearing to determine factual innocence is in the "interest ofjustice."
Argument
RMIC agrees with the State that the innocence statute is not satisfied by the mere
fact that a petitioner's "conviction has been overturned." (State's Brief at 25.) Thus, to
the extent Mr. Miller argues that he need not satisfy the provisions of the innocence
statute, RMIC disagrees. For this reason, RMIC will not address the arguments presented
by the State on pages 24 to 32 of its brief.
RMIC will address the other arguments presented by the State and outline the
analytical framework in which trial courts should review factual innocence petitions.
I. The "Bona Fide Issue" Pleading Standard That Determines Whether a
Hearing Is Required Is Distinct From the "Clear and Convincing" Burden of
Proof Standard That Applies in the Hearing
The State describes the wrong standard for determining whether Mr. Miller's
petition warrants a hearing to determine factual innocence. The district court did not
consider whether the petition presented a "bona fide issue," but instead ruled that the
petition does not describe evidence that "would 'establish' he was innocent." Based upon
that description, the State characterizes this appeal as follows: "This case is about
whether the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was factually
innocent.,,6 (State's Brief at 17.) However, this case never proceeded beyond the
6The State elsewhere describes the trial court's ruling as reflecting the fact that
Mr. Miller failed "to prove factual innocence." (State's Brief at 14 (emphasis added).)
The State later considers dispositive that in light of evidence suggesting that Mr. Miller
was in Louisiana at the time of the crime, Mr. Miller "could conceivably have gotten on
an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a stranger for a few dollars." (Id. at 22
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pleading stage because the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). If the State is correct that the trial court applied the "clear and convincing"
burden of proof, then the trial court erred.
The State fails to distinguish between the pleading standard described in section
402 and the burden ofproof standard described in section 404. Section 402 is titled,
"Petition for determination of factual innocence -- Sufficient allegations -- Notification of
victim." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402. That section outlines the standards by which
courts evaluate the allegations in petitions and determine whether to order a hearing to
determine factual innocence. Id. Section 402(6)(b)(i) states that a court "shall order a
hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is factually
innocent." Id. § 78B-9-402(6)(b)(i) (emphasis added).
The court has previously stated that the term '''bona fide' is defined as being
'made in good faith without fraud or deceit'" or as being "'in or with good faith;
honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud. '" State v. One 1979 Pontiac
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682,689 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary, 250 (1986) and Black's Law Dictionary, 160 (5th ed. 1979), respectively)).
Under the test for accord and satisfaction, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a "bona
fide dispute" exists where there is "a good-faith disagreement over the amount due under
the contract." Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ~14, 84 P.3d 1154.
(quoting Pet'r. Brief at 24).) The State then equates "conceivability" with the lack of
"clear and convincing evidence" and concludes that Mr. Miller "has failed to meet his
burden of proof to establish by 'clear and convincing evidence' that he is factually
innocent." (Id. at 23.)
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The "bona fide" or "good faith" standard is akin to the standards in Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a lesser standard than that required to avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6). However, because petitions under the actual innocence statute are
also governed by non-conflicting parts of Rule 65C, the "bona fide issue" standard is
interpreted in light of the "frivolous on its face" standard in Rule 65C(g), which is
defined, in relevant part, as "the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter
oflaw" or "the claims have no arguable basis in fact." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(2).
It is not an accident that the "bona fide issue" standard governs whether the trial
court must hold a hearing. It addresses the problem that "after trial, convicted criminal
defendants seeking to prove their innocence through newly discovered non-DNA
evidence have trouble obtaining access to full-fledged evidentiary hearings in state
courts." Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and
Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 686
(2005). Illustrating this problem, one study found that courts in San Diego ordered
hearings in only 6 of 312 cases. Stephen 1. Perrelo & Albert N. Delzeit, Habeas Corpus
in San Diego Superior Court (1991-1993): An Empirical Study, 19 T. Jefferson L. Rev.
283 (1997).
In contrast to the "bona fide issue" standard to obtain a hearing, the innocence
statute articulates a "clear and convincing" standard for evaluating the evidence presented
at a hearing. Section 404 is titled, "Hearing upon petition -- Procedures -- Court
determination of factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404. That section's first
sentence confirms that it governs hearings, not petitions: "In any hearing conducted
under this part, the Utah attorney general shall represent the state." Id. § 78B-9-
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404(1)(a). The next sentence describes a petitioner's burden of proof at the hearing:
"The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by clear
and convincing evidence." Id. § 78B-9-404(1)(b).
With the "bona fide issue" standard to be entitled to a hearing and the "clear and
convincing" standard to prove innocence at the hearing, the innocence statute enhances
"the possibility that (a) actually innocent prisoners will receive evidentiary hearings in
newly discovered evidence cases and (b) orly valid claims of innocence eventually obtain
relief." Medwed, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. at 689. For that reason, properly distinguishing
between section 402's pleading standard and section 404' s burden ofproof is crucial to
carrying out the purpose of the innocence statute. To satisfy the "bona fide issue"
standard, a petitioner need not establish, or demonstrate, or prove anything by clear and
convincing evidence.
This court should (i) reject the State's attempt to import the "clear and
convincing" standard into the pleading requirements and (ii) stress that the "clear and
convincing" standard applies to evidence presented at a hearing to determine innocence.
In contrast, the "bona fide issue" standard is used to evaluate allegations presented in a
petition to determine whether the trial court must order a hearing in the first place.
II. Evidence Is Cumulative Where It Is the Same Evidence In a Different Form,
Not Where Different Evidence Supports the Same Theory
The trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether the petition
describes evidence that is "merely cumulative" of evidence presented at trial. Section
402 requires a petitioner to describe evidence that "is not merely cumulative of evidence
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that was known." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(iii). Here, the evidence described
in the petition was not "merely cumulative" of evidence Mr. Miller presented at trial.
At trial, Mr. Miller and the State stipulated that Mr. Miller was on leave from his
job in Louisiana at the time of the crime. (R.2.) That was trial counsel's attempt at
presenting an alibi defense. Beverly Kolder and Berthella Miller did not testify at trial.
(R. 31-48.) After Mr. Miller was convicted, Mr. Miller presented the affidavits of
Beverly Kolder and Berthella Miller at a Rule 23B hearing to determine whether
Mr. Miller's trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective. (R. 8.) These same
affidavits are described in and attached to the petition. (R. 49, 172.) The trial court
refused to consider the affidavits on the ground that "Petitioner has not shown that the
evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not cumulative of evidence presented at trial.
Petitioner presented his alibi defense at trial. These additional witness[es] would have
served only to bolster his testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion." (R. 172.)
The district court's interpretation of "cumulative" would overly restrict factual
innocence claims and thereby undermine the purpose of the innocence statute. To
illustrate, consider what took place here. At trial, Mr. Miller testifies that he was in
Louisiana at the time of the crime, but provides no other evidence in support of an alibi.
Mr. Miller is convicted with very weak, but not legally insufficient, evidence and is
sentenced to life in prison. Years after the conviction, several people come forward with
credible evidence that Mr. Miller was in Louisiana at the time of the crime. Under the
broad interpretation of "cumulative," all of the newly discovered evidence would be
cumulative of Mr. Miller's testimony at trial because the new evidence "would have
served only to bolster his testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion." (R. 172.)
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In fact, if newly discovered DNA evidence were to demonstrate that Mr. Miller
was in Louisiana at the time of the crime, that evidence would also merely "bolster"
Mr. Miller's testimony and would not present a "wholly new assertion." Under the broad
interpretation of "cumulative," then, a petition describing such DNA evidence would fail
as a matter of law. Nor could the "interest ofjustice" exception solve this problem under
the trial court's interpretation. The trial court ruled that it need not consider the "interest
ofjustice" exception because the evidence in the petition was cumulative of evidence
presented at trial. (R. 172.) Such results would undermine the innocence statute's
purpose of providing wrongly convicted prisoners a mechanism to regain their freedom
regardless of when they discover new evidence of their factual innocence. It makes no
sense to interpret the "cumulative" requirement to preclude such claims.
Instead, this court should adopt the definition of "cumulative" in the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"), from which the language in the innocence statute
was copied. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-1 04(e)7 with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
402(2). In interpreting the term "cumulative" in the PCRA, this court has held that third-
party testimony that a witness had admitted to lying at trial is cumulative of a letter in
7 Utah Code section 78B-9-1 04(e), with emphasis added, provides:
... newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was
known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
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which the same witness recanted her testimony. Loose v. State, 2006 UT App. 149,
,-r,-r11-12, 37, 135 P.3d 886. In other words, the testimony was cumulative because it
merely restated what the recantation letter said. Id. at ,-r37.
The definition of "cumulative" in Loose is "the same evidence in a different
form." In contrast, the definition employed by the trial court was "different evidence that
supports the same theory" or, as the trial court put it, the same "assertion." (R. 172.)
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence8 defines "cumulative" even more
narrowly than this court did in Loose: "Evidence is 'cumulative' when it adds very little
to the probative force of the other evidence in the case, so that if it were admitted its
contribution to the determination of truth would be outweighed by its contribution to the
length of trial, with all the potential for confusion, as well as prejudice to other litigants,
who must wait longer for their trial, that a long trial creates." United States v. Williams,
81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th Cir.l996) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has
articulated a similarly narrow definition of "cumulative" in Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.9 State v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1985) (holding "verbatim
restatements of the informant's in-court testimony" to be cumulative).
Consistent with this, this court has stated that "[e]vidence is cumulative if it is 'of
the same character as existing evidence and ... supports a fact established by the existing
8 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403.
9 "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403.
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evidence (esp[ecially] that which does not need further support).'" State v. Wengreen,
2007 UT App 264, ,-r24, 167 P.3d 516 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 458 (abr. 7th ed.
2000)).
A fact that indicates innocence needs further support as long as that fact is
susceptible to further support. Here, the fact that Mr. Miller was in Louisiana at the time
of the crime requires further support because, according to the State in its brief, that fact
has not been established. (State's Brief at 23-24.) Therefore, the evidence described in
the petition is not "merely cumulative" of the evidence Mr. Miller presented at trial.
This court should reject the broad definition of "cumulative" and adopt the more
narrow definition that is consistent with the purpose of the innocence statute: Evidence is
cumulative if it is the same evidence in a different form, but it is not cumulative if it is
different evidence that happens to support the same theory or "assertion."
III. The Trial Court Should Have Determined Whether the "Interest of Justice"
Required a Hearing to Determine Factual Innocence
The trial court also applied the wrong standards under section 402(2)(a)(vi), which
defines what constitutes "newly discovered evidence" and then sets forth two exceptions
to the requirement that some evidence described in a petition must be "newly
discovered." The exceptions are (i) prior counsel was constitutionally ineffective and
(ii) it is in the interest ofjustice to determine factual innocence. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
9-402(2)(a)(vi)(B)-(C). Assuming the trial court correctly decided that the petition does
not describe "newly discovered evidence," which is not entirely clear,10 the trial court
erred in its interpretation of the two exceptions.
10 As the State notes in its brief, the petition describes "additional testimony as to an alibi
defense." (State's Brief at 18.)
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A. The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Standard in Analyzing the
"Ineffective Assistance" Exception
Section 402(2)(a)(vi)(B) describes the first exception to the "newly discovered
evidence" requirement: "[A] court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
402(2)(a)(vi)(B). This exception can be satisfied by the constitutionally deficient
performance of any prior counsel.
The trial court ruled that because it had previously found during the Rule 23B
remand hearing that Mr. Miller's trial counsel had not been constitutionally ineffective,
Mr. Miller could not satisfY the "ineffective assistance" exception. (R. 172.) The trial
court did not consider whether Mr. Miller's counsel during the Rule 23B remand hearing
was constitutionally ineffective. (R. 171-73.) Therefore, the trial court's ruling
concerning the "ineffective assistance" exception is incomplete.
The State suggests in its brief that the "ineffective assistance" exception applies
only where a prior court has already found that prior counsel was constitutionally
ineffective. (State's Brief at 20.) This court should reject the State's suggestion and
clarify that a trial court entertaining an innocence petition may be the same court that
finds prior counsel's performance to have been constitutionally ineffective. Section
402(2)(a)(vi)(B) requires that "a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel," a
requirement that includes a prior court's determination that counsel was constitutionally
ineffective, just as the State notes. This language does not require a prior court to make
the finding, however, but only that the "ineffective assistance" finding be made prior to
application of the "ineffective assistance" exception.
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B. The Trial Court Must Determine Whether The "Interest of Justice"
Exception Applies
The trial court erred in failing to determine whether the "interest ofjustice"
exception applies in this case. The "interest ofjustice" exception provides that a court
may "waive[] the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest
ofjustice.,,11 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(C). The trial court refused to
consider whether that exception applied because "Petitioner has not met other prongs of
Section 78B-9-402." (R. 172.) The "other prongs" were the "not merely cumulative"
requirement in section 402(2)(a)(iii) and the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in
section 404(1 )(b). As demonstrated above, however, the trial court misapplied these
standards, and therefore, they cannot provide a basis for its failure to consider the
"interest ofjustice" exception. For that reason, this court should reverse and remand to
allow the trial court to consider a factual innocence determination is in the "interest of
justice."
There is reason to believe that the trial court would find that the "interest of
justice" exception applies. First, the State agreed during an appeal from Mr. Miller's
conviction that "the interest ofjustice dictate that [Mr. Miller] receive a new trial."
(R. 30.) Second, in the trial court, the prosecutor did not proceed to trial, but instead
moved to dismiss all charges, which the trial court did, not because there was insufficient
II The State describes the trial court's refusal to consider the "interest ofjustice"
exception as the trial court "specifically decid[ing] not to waive these requirements."
(State's Brief at 21.) The language in the trial court's order suggests otherwise:
"Although the Court could waive either or both of these requirements in the interest of
justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met other prongs of Section 78B-9-402."
(R. 172.) The trial court made no finding concerning the "interest ofjustice" exception,
but instead found that the petition failed as a matter of law for independent, or "other,"
reasons.
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evidence or on the sole ground that the State had requested dismissal, but "in the interest
ofjustice." (State's Brief at Addendum F.) Third, even before a hearing in this case, the
trial court found that "the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the
crime." (R. 172.) This last statement by the trial court suggests that even if the State is
correct that a hearing would "duplicate" the Rule 23B remand hearing,12 the result of a
hearing in this case may well be different.
Perhaps more important than these three considerations, however, is that the
evidence of factual innocence is overwhelming. As Mr. Miller describes in his brief, in
light of the alibi evidence it is barely conceivable that he committed the crime: After
suffering a stroke that made it nearly impossible for him to travel alone, Mr. Miller would
have had to leave is job in Louisiana, travel 1800 miles to Utah without any of his
caretakers, immediately commit a random crime against a stranger for almost no gain,
and then almost immediately travel 1800 miles back home. (Pet'r. Brief at 11-12.) In
response, the State points out that Mr. Miller "could conceivably" have committed the
crime, hardly a firm basis for dismissing Mr. Miller's petition as a matter of law without
any hearing. (State's Brief at 22.)
In light of these considerations, the trial court should have the opportunity to
consider the "interest ofjustice" exception.
12 The State also argues that Mr. Miller has "no right to relitigate factual determinations
already made" by citing ordinary issue preclusion case law. (State's Brief at 33.) Of
course, whether Mr. Miller has that right under the innocence statute depends upon
whether the trial court finds that it is in the interest ofjustice to allow Mr. Miller to
relitigate a factual determination in a new setting designed to determine factual innocence
instead of whether trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.
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Conclusion
This court should clarify the standards in the innocence statute regardless of the
outcome of this appeal. The trial court misunderstood the "bona fide issue" standard, the
"merely cumulative" standard, the "ineffective assistance" exception, and the scope of its
ability to consider the merits of a petition in the "interest ofjustice." This court should
take this opportunity to provide guidance to district courts in applying the innocence
statute to ensure that it serves its purpose of providing factually innocent prisoners access
to courts and, for all but frivolous petitions, a hearing to establish their innocence.
Request to Participate at Oral Argument
Because this court will be interpreting the innocence statute for the first time, and
RMIC's brief provides perspective and arguments that were not advanced by either party,
RMIC requests that it be provided independent time during any oral argument to respond
to the court's questions concerning the arguments raised by RMIC.
t·,
...
Respectfully submitted July 15,2009.
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